Dollarization and inflation in a two-country optimization model by Heng-fu Zou
Journal  o( International  Money  and Finance  ( 1993  ),  12, 209-220 
Dollarization  and  inflation  in  a  two-country 
optimization  model 
HENG-FU  Zou* 
Policy  Research  Department,  The  World Bank,  Washington  DC 20433,  USA 
In a two-country, two-currency model,  this  paper examines the conditions 
of  dollarization,  analyzes  the  effect  of  government  inflation  finance  and 
studies  the  strategic  interdependence  of different-currency  inflation.  (JEL 
F30). 
As in Ortiz  ( 1983  ) ,  dollarization here measures the degree of shift from using 
domestic currency toward foreign money as a legal tender. For obvious reasons, 
we take foreign money as the dollar. Many existing studies such as Fischer ( 1982, 
1983) and  Lamdany and  Dorlhiac  ( 1987) have focused on the country experi­
encing dollarization. In our study, we assume that there are two countries in the 
world:  the  USA  and  LA  (which  stands  for  Latin  America);  the  dollar  is  the 
currency  of the  USA and the peso is the currency  of  LA; and  dollarization is 
going  on  only  in  LA.  In Section  I  we will  set up a  two-country  optimization 
model for the representative families in the USA and LA and discuss the conditions 
for  dollarization  in  LA  under  the  assumption  that  the  government  in  LA 
distributes  its  inflation  tax  to  the  public  through  lump-sum  transfers.  In 
Section  II, we introduce government inflation finance in LA into the model and 
present a coherent, general equilibrium model for the determination of both peso 
and  dollar  inflation  rates.  The  conditions  for  dollarization  and  the  strategic 
choices of the peso and dollar inflation rates by the governments will be analyzed 
in detail. We summarize our main findings in Section Ill. 
I.  Currency substitution in LA and dollarization 
We  assume  that  there  is  free  trade  between  the  USA  and  LA  and  there  is 
one  homogeneous  good  with  price  p.  A  representative  family  in  LA  derives 
instantaneous utility from consumption and the liquidity services of real balances. 
With currency substitution in  LA, both  LA's peso and the  US dollar provide 
liquidity services.  Following Stockman  ( 1978) and Liviatan  ( 1981  ), we assume 
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that the  preference  of the representative  family in LA is  functionally  separable 
in per capita consumption and the real balances: 
U(c*,m*,m1)= U(c*)+ V(m*,Em1), 
where all variables are in real terms, and c* is per capita consumption, m* is per 
capita  peso  holdings,  m  f is  per  capita  dollar  holdings,  and  E is the  exchange 
rate; U(.) and  V(.) are increasing and concave in c*, m*, and m1. 
Free trade between the USA and LA and one homogeneous good in the whole 
world market make it plausible to assume purchasing power parity: 
p*  = Ep, 
where p* is the price of consumption goods denominated in pesos. 
With two kinds of currencies in  the portfolio of  the representative family  in 
LA, the per capita real asset in terms of pesos is the sum of these two currencies 
divided by the peso price: 
a*= (M*/p*N*)  + (M/p*N*)  = m* + EM/pN* = m* + Em1, 
where N* is the population in LA.  For simplicity we let the population growth 
rates in both the  USA and  LA  equal zero. 
We might as well assume that the initial exchange rate E is equal to one, then 
a*= m* + m1. 
The typical family in LA maximizes a discounted utility over an infinite horizon 
subject to the budget constraint: 
Max Ix [U(c*)  + V(m*, m1)]e-p*1dt 
s.t. a*  = y* + x*  -c* - nm1  -n*m*, 
a*= m1 + m*, 
where  p* is the time discount rate,  y* is per capita real income,  x* is the LA 
government's transfer to its citizens, n is the expected dollar inflation rate, n* is 
the  expected inflation  rate  for  the  peso,  and  a  dot  over  a variable denotes  the 
time  derivative. 




V1/V2  = (n* + p*)/(n + p*), 
V1-U'(c*)(n*  + p*)  +  U"(c*)i"*  = 0, 
y*  + x*-c*- n*m*- nmf- mf-m* = 0. 
The corresponding optimization  program  for  a  representative  family  in  the 
USA is: 
S.t. mu  = y +X-C-nmu, 
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representative  family  of the  USA,  p  is  the  time  discount  rate,  and  x  is  the 
government transfer to each family member. 
The necessary conditions for optimization are 
(4) 
(5) 
u2- u1  (n + p*) +  u11c  + u12mu  =  0, 
y +  X - C - 7r mu  - mu  = 0. 
Now we turn to the  LA  and  the  US  governments' money supplies and their 
transfer to their citizens.  For simplicity, we further assume that the population 
sizes in these  two  countries  are  the  same:  N  = N* and  N and  N* are  total 
population in the USA and LA respectively. Thus the real dollar supply per US 
citizen is 





m*  = [8*- (p*  /p*  )]m*' 
mu  = [8u- (P/p)]mu, 
mf  = [8!- (fJ/p)]mf, 
where 8* is the peso growth rate in LA, 8u and 8  f are the dollar growth rates in 
the USA and LA respectively.  With perfect foresight, 
(9) 
(10) 
P*  /p*  = n*, 
PIP= n. 
Substituting < 9) and (10) into  (  6  ),  < 7  ), and (  8): 
< 11)  m* = (  8* - n*  )m*' 
(12)  mu=( 8u- n)mu, 
(13) 
The transfer from LA's government to its citizens is 
< 14)  x* = 8*m*. 
The US government transfer is 
(15) 
Substituting (11), (12), (13), (14), and (15) into the dynamic equations 
(1  ), (  2  ), (3  ), (  4  ), and (  5) and assuming the steady state (in the steady state, 







VtfV2  = (8* + p*)/(8 +  p*), 
V1- U'(c*)(8* + p*) =  0, 
V2- U'(c*)(8 +  p*) = 0, 
y*- c* -8mf = 0, 
u2- u1(8 + p)  = 0, 
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One equation out of< 16), < 17 ), and < 18) is redundant, but we present all here 
for the convenience of analysis. Equations< 17) and  < 18) are optimal conditions 
regarding consumption and real balances holdings in LA and equation < 20) is 
the corresponding optimal condition for the  USA. These three equations imply 
that the marginal rates of substitution between real balances and consumption 
equal the opportunity cost of real balance holdings. 
Condition  (16) is the optimal condition  for currency substitution in  LA.  It 
says that the marginal rate of substitution of the two currencies equals the ratio 
of their costs (the money growth rate plus the time discount rate). This optimal 
condition suggests that any currency with a high growth rate will be substituted 
away  by the  currency  with  a  low  inflation  rate  (suprisingly this is not true  as 
shown in Proposition  1  below), and, in particular, complete dollarization is just 
a  special  case  when  the  peso  and  dollar  are  perfect  substitutes  in  generating 
liquidity  services,  i.e  ..  if  V(m*, m1) =  V(m* + m1  ).  In  this  case,  V1 =  V2  and 
complete dollarization will happen in  LA so long as  the peso inflation rate is 
higher than the dollar inflation rate. But this kind of perfect substitutability does 
not exist in  the real world and both the peso and dollar are used as a medium 
of transaction in the countries experiencing dollarization, though the peso has a 
much higher inflation rate than the dollar.  For this reason we will focus on the 
situation where the peso and dollar are imperfect substitutes. 
The steady state budget constraint < 19) says that the income in LA is divided 
between consumption and the cost of dollar holdings. From now on, the cost of 
dollar holdings, Om1, will be denoted as  s,  where 
s  =  Om1; 
it is the seigniorage collected by the USA. From the steady state budget constraint 
for the USA-equation< 21  ), it is clear that the seigniorage has been redistributed 
among  US citizens in the form of lump-sum transfers. 
We now turn to the condition for dollarization under a flexible exchange rate. 
Throughout this section, it is assumed that consumption goods are normal and 
that an  increase in income will lead to more consumption in the steady state: 
de*  ldy*  >  0, 
which is the same as requiring that 
< 22 >  �  =  Vi 2  -V1  1 V22 +  U"  (  c* )8 { (  O* + p*)  V12  -(  o + p*  )Vu}  < o, 
because de*  I  dy*  =  [Vi 2  -V1 1 V22] I� and the numerator is negative as V ( . ) is 
concave. 
As for the cross partial derivative, V12, it can be positive (  cooperant) or negative 
(  noncooperant) as in Livia  tan ( 1981 ). Calvo and Rodriguez ( 1977) and Livia  tan 
( 1981) have studied monetary expansion and real exchange rate determination 
under the assumption that the peso and dollar are cooperant. From Proposition 1 
below, it is clear that dollarization will not take place when these two currencies 
are cooperant. 
Proposition  I:  If the  dollar and peso  are  cooperant,  V12 >  0, and  then  a high 
peso inflation reduces both  peso and  dollar holdings  in  LA; if  the  dollar  and 
peso are noncooperant, V12 <  0, and a high peso inflation reduces peso holdings 
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Proof: Totally differentiate the steady state optimal conditions ( 17  ) ,  ( 18  ), and 
(19): 
(23 >  [-U"(e*)(8* + p*)  V11 
-U"(e*)(8 + p*)  Vtz 
-1  0 
V12]  [  de* ] [  U' (  e*  )(  d8* + dp* )] 
V22  dm*  =  U'(e*)(d8 + dp*)  . 
-8  dm1  m1d8-dy* 
The determinant of  the  3  x  3 matrix is given by  � in  (  22  ), which is negative 




dm*  U' (e*) 
=  [V22 +  U"(e*)&(8 +  p*)]  <  0, 
d8*  � 
d111_£ = (j'(c*)V12 
>  0 (  < O) 
d8*  �  ' 
de*  -U '(c*)&V 
= -- 12
<0(>0) 
dO*  � 
if  vl 2  < o ( v� 2 > o) , 
if  v12  < o ( v12 > o). 
The result (  24) is true because a higher peso inflation raises the cost of liquidity 
services from the peso and people will economize their peso holdings. If the dollar 
and peso are cooperant, V12 >  0,  and the reduction of peso holdings following 
a higher peso inflation will reduce the marginal utility of the liquidity services 
from the dollar.  Hence, dollar holdings will be reduced in this case.  From the 
steady  state  budget  constraint,  lower  dollar  holdings  mean  lower  seigniorage 
collected by the USA so that people in LA have more income for consumption. 
This is why consumption in LA will rise following higher peso inflation if the 
peso and dollar are cooperant. 
On  the other hand, if the peso and dollar are noncooperant, V12  <  0,  and a 
smaller  amount  of  peso holdings leads  to a  large  marginal  utility  of  liquidity 
services from the dollar. Thus a higher peso inflation induces people to substitute 
dollars for pesos. For a given dollar inflation rate, more dollar holdings give rise 
to  a  greater  inflation  tax  paid  to  the  USA  and  less  income  available  for 
consumption in  LA.  This explains the signs of changes in  dollar holdings and 
consumption in (  25) and < 26) when V12  <  0. 
Another special case of Proposition 1 is when the peso and dollar are separable 
in utility: V12 = 0.  In this case, equation < 24) still holds and the reason for it 
is  the same as  before.  But higher peso inflation will not alter the  steady  state 
dollar holdings and consumption in LA  : 
dmf/d&* = de*  jd8* 
=  0  if  v12 = 0. 
Peso  inflation  also  affects  welfare  in  the  USA.  If  the  peso  and  dollar  are 
cooperant, a higher peso inflation reduces both peso and dollar holdings in LA 
and thus lowers the seigniorage collected by the USA. As less income is available 
for the USA, consumption and real balance holdings will be smaller in the USA. 
The case of cooperancy between the peso and the dollar leads to just the opposite: 
higher peso inflation increases dollar holdings and seigniorage collected by the 
USA; therefore consumption and real balances rise in the  USA. 
Proposition  2:  An  increase  in  the  dollar  inflation  rate  always  reduces  dollar 214  Dollarization  and inflation 
holdings  in  LA;  its  effects  on  peso  holdings  and  consumption  m  LA  are 
ambiguous. 
The proof is straightforward by applying Cramer's rule in < 23) and obtaining 
dm  f I d8  < 0. The effects on consumption and peso holdings in LA are ambiguous 
because  the  seigniorage  collected  by  the  USA  can  increase  or  decrease  when 
dollar inflation is higher.  For example, if higher dollar inflation results in more 
seigniorage collected by the USA, consumption in  LA will decrease. As for the 
peso  holdings,  the  noncooperancy  (  cooperancy)  between  the  dollar  and  peso 
tends to raise  (lower) peso holdings, but a lower income tends to reduce them. 
The asymmetry between peso inflation and dollar inflation lies in the fact that, 
for  the  representative  family  in  LA,  the  government's  seigniorage  from  peso 
inflation is transferred to consumers while the dollar represents a real cost from 
LA's national standpoint.  The steady state budget constraint makes this point 
very clear. 
Next we turn to the discussion of  seigniorage collected by  the  USA.  We first 
extend the usual properties of seigniorage to the case of currency  substitution. 
For the  USA, the seigniorage is given by: 
s( 8, 8*)  =  Om1 (8, 8*), 
which is a function of both the dollar inflation rate and the peso inflation rate. 
We will assume that the seigniorage can be represented by a Laffer curve, namely, 
that there exists a positive inflation rate  (J such that OS I ao is positive for 8  <  (J 
and negative for 8  >  rJ; and  c2slc82  <  0. 
With  currency  substitution,  we  know  that,  from  Proposition  1,  as I c8*  is 
positive  if the  two  currencies  are  noncooperant  and  it  is negative  if  the  two 
currencies are cooperant.  Furthermore it is reasonable to have 
Assumption 1: c2  s I c8* c8  >  0 if the peso and the dollar are noncooperant  and 
o2siD8* o8  <  0 if the peso and the dollar are cooperant. 
For the case of noncooperancy, a small increase in dollar inflation following a 
higher peso inflation should not reduce dollar holdings too much in  LA, stated 
in terms of the following expression, 
c2slc8* cO= 8(c2m11rl8 cO*)+ (cm11rl8*), 
the first term  (cross effect) should not be so negative as to dominate the second 
term  (direct effect), which is positive for the noncooperant case. For the case of 
cooperancy,  the  second  term  is negative.  We  will  expect  this  direct  effect  to 
dominate the cross effect no matter whether the cross effect is positive or negative. 
With the  Laffer curve assumption and assumption  1,  it is simple to  see  how 
the dollar inflation rate should respond to peso inflation if the  USA  attempts to 
maximize the inflation tax from LA. The first-order condition is the familiar one: 
Totally differentiating this equation yields: 
d8  - ( c2  s  1  il8 c8*) 
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Therefore, if the two currencies are noncooperant, 
d()jd()* >  0. 
But if the dollar and peso are cooperant, 
d()jd()* <  0. 
That  is  to  say, if  the  peso  and dollar  are  noncooperant,  an increase  in  peso 
inflation leads people in LA to switch to more dollar holdings, and the USA can 
collect more seigniorage by raising dollar inflation.  If these two currencies are 
cooperant, high peso inflation reduces both peso and dollar holdings and, hence, 
when peso inflation is high, the dollar inflation rate should be reduced in order 
to avoid more loss of seigniorage income from LA. 
II.  Government inflation finance in LA and the determination of the peso and 
dollar inflation rates 
In  the real world,  dollarization is often  observed  in those  countries  in which 
inflation  finance is the main instrument  used  to  raise revenue for government 
spending. When inflation finance by LA's government is taken into consideration 
in the representative family model, the budget constraint becomes 
a*= y*- c* -nmf- n*m*, 
a*= mf + m*. 
So the government transfer, x*, is set to be zero. 
The new steady state equilibrium conditions are 
(17) 
< 18) 
V1- U'(c*)(()* + p*)  = 0, 
V2- U'(c*)(() + p*) = 0, 
(27)  y*- c*- fJ*m*- fJmf  = 0. 
If we denote the peso inflation tax by s*  (  fJ*, fJ  ), then from (27), 
s*(fJ*, fJ) = fJ*m*(fJ*, fJ). 
In this new setting, both dollar and peso inflation are real tax burdens on the 
representative family in LA and the asymmetric roles of dollar and peso inflation 
in Section III disappear here. As we have seen from  Proposition  1, the case of 
cooperancy  between the dollar  and peso  does not impose  a serious  constraint 
on  LA's  government inflation  finance  because  a  high  peso inflation  tends  to 
reduce both  peso  and  dollar  holdings,  and dollarization  may  not  necessarily 
happen  in  LA  even though the peso inflation is high.  Therefore, we will focus 
on the case in which the peso and dollar are noncooperant and, unless otherwise 
noted, it will be assumed throughout this section that  V12 
<  0. 
To  understand the connection between the LA  government's inflation finance 
and dollarization, we first note that, if the stream of liquidity services from peso 
holdings is a normal consumption good, peso holdings will be reduced following 
high peso inflation: am* I a  a* <  0.  But the seigniorage s* =  fJ*m* may go up or 216  Dollari::ation and inflation 
down.  If  s* goes down for a higher  peso inflation  rate, we  have the  following 
strong result: 
Proposition  3:  If the  peso  inflation  tax is given  by  a  Laffer  curve,  then,  for  a 
given dollar inflation rate e, there exists a critical peso inflation rate [f* such that 
dollarization  will  always  take  place  for  (}* >  IJ*;  and  8* is  determined  by  the 
equation  us* 1 ae*  =  o. 
Proof:  Since  s*(B*, 0) is  a  Laffer  curve,  we  have,  for  a  given  e,  a  unique  IJ* 
satisfying  the  equation  cs*  (  8*, e  )I ae*  =  o and  cs* 1 ae* > o  for  e* <  IJ*  and 
ils*  I cO* < o for 0* >  8*. 
Now  consider  the case:  0* >  0* and  (ls*  I c(}* <  0.  Differentiating  the  steady 
state budget constraint < 27) with respect to the peso inflation rate (}*: 
(28) 
The  right-hand  side  of < 28)  is  positive  as  Ds*  I 8(}*  is  negative  for  (}* >  8*. 
The left-hand side can be written as  (via conditions < 18 )): 
(29)  { 
v22-- + e}  ern  I 
('B* +  ·····  v12  -- ern*  I cO*. 
((} + p)U"(c*) 
I  ({} + p)U"(c*) 
In (  29), the second term is negative for  V12 
< 0, ern*  I tJ()* < 0 and  U" <  0. The 
coefficient  of  Drnflc8* is positive.  Therefore, to  have  equation  (28),  Drnflc8* 
has  to be positive; that  is to  say,  when  (}* >  8*,  dollarization definitely takes 
place.  Q.E.D. 
The economic explanation for this result is the following: If the peso inflation 
rate is higher than the seigniorage maximizing rate 8*, seigniorage income from 
further  peso  inflation  will  be  reduced  and  the  public  will  have  more  income 
available for both consumption and dollar holdings. This income effect of dollar 
holdings will be further reinforced by the substitution effect-high peso inflation 
directly reduces peso demand and increases the attractiveness of the dollar when 
the  peso  and  dollar  are  noncooperant.  Therefore,  dollarization  will  definitely 
happen  on  the  wrong  side  of  the  Laffer  curve  and  LA's  government  in  this 
situation can reduce its national loss and, at the same time, raise more inflation 
tax by lowering the peso inflation rate. 
What will happen if the  peso  inflation  is  below  the  critical  level  0* '?  As  we 
have pointed out, s* is rising for 8* <  0* and people in LA will end up with less 
income  for  a higher peso  inflation.  Though a  high peso inflation  rate  induces 
people in  LA to substitute the dollar for peso holdings, the  income effect may 
dominate the substitution effect and dollar holdings may also be reduced.  If the 
substitution effect dominates the income effect, dollarization will take place for 
0* <  rf*. It is often stated that the LA government can do better without causing 
dollarization.  For  LA's national  interest, this is absolutely  right.  But for  LA's 
government, keeping a very low peso inflation and  avoiding dollarization may 
result in a  significant  loss  of  government revenue.  This  is  especially  true  here 
because dollarization happens at the same time that the peso inflation tax collected 
by LA's government is rising. 
Our  model  also provides us with a coherent general equilibrium framework 
that  we  can  use  to  study  inflation determination for  different currencies.  The 
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models studying only  the country  experiencing dollarization.  In the  following, 
we will show how seigniorage maximization by LA's government and how welfare 
or seigniorage maximization by the US government lead to the equilibrium peso 
and dollar inflation rates.  We begin with  LA. 
Suppose that  LA's government intends to  maximize its seigniorage from its 
citizens given the possibility that its people can substitute the dollar for the peso. 
Obviously its choice of proper peso inflation ()* depends on the dollar inflation 
rate  e.  In the  special case where the peso and  dollar  are perfect substitutes in 
generating liquidity services, i.e., V (  m*, m  1) =  V (  m* + m  1  ), people in LA will be 
indifferent between holding pesos or dollars if they have the same inflation rate. 
If the peso inflation rate is higher than the dollar inflation rate, as we mentioned 
earlier,  there will be complete dollarization and  LA  government's seigniorage 
from peso inflation will be zero. Therefore, in this case, the optimal strategy for 
LA's government is to set the peso inflation rate such that it is less than or equal 
to the dollar inflation rate. 
In  the  more  general  case  in  which  the  peso  and  dollar  are  imperfect 
substitutions, it is quite reasonable to assume as in Proposition 3 that the peso 
inflation tax  collected by  LA's  government is given by the usual  Laffer  curve 
and that higher peso inflation accompanied by higher dollar inflation should not 
reduce seigniorage collected by LA's  government: 
Assumption  2:  rPsjo8* 88 > 0. 
Again, due to the Laffer curve properties of s* (  8*, 8  ), the necessary and sufficient 
condition for maximizing s*(8*, 8) by choosing ()* (given 8) is 
(30)  os*(8*, 8)/88*  =  m* + ()*(om* ;ae*)  =  0. 
With assumption 2, it is simple to see 
(31) 
Hence lower  peso inflation should follow lower dollar inflation and the dollar 
inflation rate sets a constraint on how much the government in LA can collect 
from the public through peso inflation.  It is simple to see that the seigniorage 
maximizing peso inflation rate with dollarization should be smaller than the one 
without  dollarization  in  LA.  This  can  be  easily  seen.  Imagine  that  there  is a 
hyperinflation  in the  USA.  For  this  extreme  case,  dollarization  will  not  take 
place in LA. By (31 ), LA's government can choose a much higher peso inflation 
rate  in  this situation than in the case  of a  moderate  or  small dollar  inflation. 
But, in practice,  governments in the dollarized countries may not pay enough 
attention to the  dollar  inflation  rate  when  choosing  their  national currencies' 
inflation rates.  The consequences of  their  actions  are further dollarization and 
less inflation tax. 
To determine dollar inflation and  its relation to peso inflation, we continue 
to assume as in the last section that s (  e, 8*) is a Laffer curve and assumption 1 
still holds.  Given peso  inflation  8*, two options are available  for  the  USA  to 
determine the dollar inflation rate. The first is welfare maximization: 
ouj(}(J  =  U1  ccj(}(J +  Uz omuj(}(J 
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This is the same as requiring that, by solving  omjo8 from  (20) and  (21 ), 
(32)  [u11(8 + p)-u12  + (8 + p)b](os/oO)  = -u1, 
here 
b =  u22-U12(8 + p) <  0. 
The term in the bracket on the left side of< 32) is negative, and the term on the 
right side is also negative, so at the optimum, 
as;ue >  0. 
Therefore,  the  welfare  maximizing  dollar  inflation  rate  chosen  by  the  US 
government lies at the increasing part of the Laffer curve and, for a given peso 
inflation rate, it is smaller than the seigniorage maximizing one. This is because 
dollar inflation has two effects: it directly reduces consumer welfare in the USA 
and  it  may  increase  or  decrease  the  seigniorage  collected  from  LA.  At  the 
optimum, the direct welfare Joss due to dollar inflation has to be compensated 
by the additional income raised by the dollar inflation. 
The second option for the USA is to maximize its seigniorage collected from LA: 
(33) 
Now  (30) and  (33) will jointly determine the peso and dollar inflation rates. 
Since the seigniorage maximizing dollar inflation rate is higher than the welfare 
maximizing one and a higher dollar inflation leads to a higher peso inflation rate 
by < 31  ), seigniorage maximization by  both governments leads to both higher 
peso and dollar inflation. 
So far our discussion of peso and dollar inflation has been limited to the Nash 
equilibria.  What does our model te11 us about the  USA as a leader and  LA as a 
fo1lower in  a  Stackelberg  game  of  seigniorage  maximization?  Using  (30), the 
peso inflation rate can be written as an increasing function of the do11ar inflation 
rate: 8*  =  8*  (  8) and dO*/  dO >  0. The USA maximizes s  (  8, 8*  (  0)) by choosing 
e.  The first-order condition is 
(34)  rs/80 + (osjoO*)(dO*/oO) =  0. 
The first term on the left-hand side of< 34) is the direct gain or Joss in seigniorage 
through an increase in the do11ar inflation rate and the second term is the indirect 
gain or Joss in seigniorage through the effect of dollar inflation on peso inflation. 
These two effects offset each other when the seigniorage is maximized. 
Comparing equilibrium condition < 34) to < 33  ), we have 
Proposition 4: The Stackelberg equilibrium rates of the peso and do1lar inflation 
are higher than the Nash equilibrium rates if peso inflation leads to more do11ar 
holdings in LA. 
Proof':  The conditions for both Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium are: 
(33' > 
(34') 
os(O", 0*(0"))/oO =  0, 
Ds(O', 0*(8'))/cO + (cs(8', O*(Os))/oO*))(dO*/dO)  =  0, 
where  0"  and  8"  denote  the  dollar  inflation  rates  for  Nash  and  Stackelberg 
equilibria respectively, and  0*  (  0) is  LA's government reaction function solved HENG-FU Zou  219 
from the condition  (30) and again  d()*  j  d(J  is  positive  (namely,  high dollar 
inflation leads to high peso inflation). 
If peso inflation results in more dollar holdings, there will be more seigniorage 
income for the USA and  osj  o()* in  (34') will be positive.  Hence, osj  oe on the 
left-hand side of< 34') (the Stackelberg equilibrium condition) has to be negative. 
But from  the condition  for  the  Nash equilibrium  (33'),  osjo(J  =  0.  We must 
show that es is larger than ()" in this case. 
Taking a Taylor expansion of  os((J', (J*((Js))jo(J at the Nash equilibrium value 
yields: 
(35) 
0 >  os(es, (J*(f}S))jo(J  =  os(en, ()*(()"))joe+ (f}S- ()") o2s(<f>"', (J*(f}'P))jo(J2 
+ (  es - en)(  o2s  (  ()"', ()* (()'")  )/  oe of)*  )d(J*  (  f}'P  )/  d(J 
=  (  es  - e")  o2  s  (  e"', e*  (  e"'))  I oe2 
+ (es- 8")(o2s(e"', e*(()"'))/oe oe*) de*((J"')/de, 
where ()"'is between es and ()". Suppose that 8' < 8". The stability condition for 
Nash equilibrium is 
o2  s*  I oe oe*  o2  s  1 oe2 
d()*  ((J"')jd(J  =  -.  ----- <  - . 
o2s*  jo()*2  o2sjo(J of)* 
Substitute  de*  1 de  into  05 >  and  note  that  es <  8"  and  o2s I oe  I oe* > o  by 
assumption  : 
0 >  os((J', (J*((JS))jo(J 
=  (()"'- ()") o2s((J"', ()*(8"'))jo(J2 + (es- (J")(o2s((J"', ()*(8"'))jo(J o(J*)d(J*((J"')/d(J 
> (  es - e") t!2  s  (  e"', e*  (  e"')) 1 oe2 
This is a contradiction  because  OS I oe cannot be less than zero and larger than 
zero at the same time. Therefore, if peso inflation leads to more dollar holdings, 
the dollar inflation for Stackelberg equilibrium will be higher than the one for 
Nash equilibrium: es >  e". Since d(J*  I  d8 is positive, the peso inflation rate is also 
higher. 
The economic intuition  for  this  proposition  is quite  clear.  As  higher  dollar 
inflation induces higher peso inflation and higher peso inflation forces people in 
LA to hold more dollars, the USA can collect a higher inflation tax from LA by 
recognizing  its leading  position  in the  Stackelberg game and  setting  a  higher 
dollar inflation rate than in the Nash equilibrium. 
III.  Summary 
In  a  two-country  model, this  paper  has  provided  insight  into  two  aspects  of 
dollarization. 220  Dollari::ation  and  inflation 
First,  if  the  government  in  LA  transfers  its  inflation  tax  to  the  public, 
dollarization will only happen when two currencies are noncooperant in generating 
liquidity  service  (Proposition  1);  if  the  government  finances  its  spending  by 
inflation  tax, dollarization will definitely  occur on the wrong  side of the  Laffer 
curve  (Proposition 3  ). 
Second,  if  seigniorage  maximization  is  the  objective  of  LA's  government, 
unintended dollarization may be an inevitable consequence of government policy 
because  under  certain  circumstances  more  seigniorage  income  and  further 
dollarization can occur at the same time. Nevertheless, the choice of proper peso 
inflation rates by  LA's government crucially depends on the strategic choices of 
the dollar inflation.  In particular, if the  US government maximizes its citizens' 
welfare, the expected dollar inflation will be moderate and so is the seigniorage 
maximizing peso inflation rate. If both governments maximize their inflation tax 
independently, the resulting peso and dollar inflation rate are likely to be high. 
When  there  exists  strategic interdependence, the  seigniorage  maximizing  peso 
and dollar inflation rates for the Stackelberg equilibrium are higher than the ones 
for the Nash equilibrium  (Proposition 4  ). 
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